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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Commencing on April 13, 1983, a landslide of massive 
proportions began moving in an easterly direction down the 
canyon toward the Spanish Fork River near the town of Thistle 
in Utah County (hereinafter referred to as the "Thistle 
slide"). From its highest elevation of 6,300 feet to its 
terminus in the base of the canyon at an elevation of 5,000 
feet, the Thistle slide encompassed over 6,000 linear feet and 
had a width of 1,000 feet. (Abstract from Transcript at Trial 
[hereinafter ffTrial Transcript11] , Bruce Kaliser, Record on 
Appeal [hereinafter the "Record"], p. 1560 [hereinafter 
"Kaliser"], p. 70; Trial Transcript, Joseph M. Olsen, Record p. 
1561, [hereinafter "Olsen"], pp. 97-98.) Experts estimated 
that, depending upon the depth of the slide, between 28 million 
and 40 million cubic yards of soil were in motion from the top 
of the Thistle slide to its base. (Kaliser, pp. 77-78; Trial 
Transcript, James Slosson, Record p. 1553, [hereinafter 
"Slosson"], p. 36.) 
1983 was an extraordinary year with respect to landslides 
in Utah. Whereas normally the Utah Geologic and Mineral Survey 
would expect 10 slides per year, it has been estimated that 
between 1,000 to 2,000 slides occurred in 1983. (Kaliser, pp. 
54, 56.) The reason for this unprecedented increase was 
clear: water. The four wet years of 1980 through 
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1983 were unprecedented in historical times. 1980 rainfall was 
119% of normal; 1981 was 142%; 1982 was 163%; and 1983 was 
203%. (Kaliser, pp. 52-53.) In recorded history, there has 
been no comparable four year cycle. (Kaliser, p. 57.) 
Geomorphologic evidence presented at trial indicated 
that the Thistle slide developed from an ancient landslide. 
The original or ancient slide occurred fourteen to fifteen 
thousand years ago with the quick draw down of Lake 
Bonneville. The evidence further indicated that in modern 
times, including 10 to 15 years prior to the Thistle slide, 
there had been significant soil movement at the head of the 
slide which resulted in "stacking" of soils in the upper to 
middle portion of the slide. (Slosson, pp. 21 and 22.) This 
material, because of both prehistoric and recent movement, was 
weaker than the material near the toe of the slide which had 
not experienced similar movement in the recent past. (Slosson, 
p. 36.) 
The record concerning the activity of the appellee, 
The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company (hereinafter 
the "Railroad"), was not in serious dispute. In approximately 
1880, a predecessor railroad made a cut near the toe of what 
later became the Thistle slide for the purpose of running its 
tracks up the canyon. In the course of expanding its tracks, 
the Railroad made a second cut in or about 1912 to 1914. A 
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final cut was made in approximately 1951. Since 1951, no 
additional cuts were made and the Railroads' grade remained 
consistent until April, 1983. (Trial Transcript, Blaine D. 
Leonard, Record, p. 1562 [hereinafter "Leonard"], pp. 89-90). 
It was estimated by Dr. Joseph Olsen, one of the plaintiff's 
experts, that the total soil removed by the railroad by virtue 
of the cuts made in 1880, 1912 and 1951 was between 10,000 to 
15,000 cubic yards. (Olsen, p. 115.) 
While it cannot be stated with absolute certainty what 
part of the slide began to move first in April, 1983, the 
evidence was overwhelming that the "dominant deriving process" 
emanated from the top or head of the slide and moved downward. 
(Trial Transcript, Norbert Morgenstern, Record, p. 1554 
[hereinafter "Morgenstern"], pp. 22, 23 and 66; Slosson, p. 26; 
Kaliser, p. 27.) 
It was the Railroad's position at trial that, 
irrespective of the reasonableness of the Railroad's conduct in 
the construction and maintenance of its right-of-way through 
Spanish Fork Canyon, under the circumstances attendant to this 
catastrophe, the Railroad's actions or inaction were not a 
cause-in-fact of the Thistle slide. The record is replete with 
evidence that, given (a) the extreme mobility of the Thistle 
slide mass due to the extraordinary ground water regime, (b) 
the highly fractured and weakened strength parameters of the 
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"stacked" soils at the head of the Thistle slide and (c) the 
immense amount of soil on the move (between 28 million to 40 
million cubic yards), the presence of the 1.0,000 to 15,000 
cubic yards of soil removed by the Railroad and its predecessor 
would not have prevented the catastrophic slide movement. 
(Morgenstern, pp. 37-38; Slosson, pp. 36-37.) Thus, had the 
Railroad never run its line adjacent to the Spanish Fork River 
at the base of the Thistle slide, the 1983 slide would have 
occurred anyway--in the same magnitude and with the same 
devastating results. 
APPELLEEfS STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Dr. Shroder. 
A. Upon the exclusion of Dr. Shroder as a 
witness in the plaintiffs' case in chief, did the 
plaintiffs make the requisite offer of proof? 
B. Did the Court abuse its discretion in 
refusing to permit the plaintiffs to name a new expert 
witness less than two weeks before trial? 
2. The Railroad's Property Insurance. 
A. Did the trial court properly exclude as 
irrelevant evidence of property insurance obtained by 
the Railroad? 
B. If the trial court erred in its ruling, was 
such error harmless? 
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C. Can the plaintiffs complain of any error in 
the trial court's exclusion of insurance evidence 
where they did not seek to introduce such evidence in 
their rebuttal case? 
3. Reference to Maurice Jackson Insurance. 
A. Did the plaintiffs object to any reference 
to one plaintiff's insurance recovery? 
B. If such a reference be error, was that error 
harmless? 
4. Juror Keith Heber. 
A. Have the plaintiffs made any showing of 
irregularity in the proceedings by virtue of the 
service of Keith Heber as a juror? 
B. If there was an error, given the 8-0 jury 
verdict, was such error harmless? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This was an action to recover damages to certain 
residents of Thistle, Utah (hereinafter referred to as the 
ffplaintiffs") resulting from flooding during the Spring of 
1983. The plaintiffs claimed that the Railroad, by its 
activities in Spanish Fork Canyon, caused a landslide over a 
mile in length and containing between 28 to 40 million cubic 
yards of soil to move across the canyon thereby damming the 
Spanish Fork River. The resulting lake formed behind the dam 
destroyed homes and property of the plaintiffs. 
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This claim was tried to a jury from August 14 through 
August 29, 1989. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury 
rendered a unanimous Special Verdict in favor of the Railroad 
finding specifically that the Railroad's activities were not a 
cause-in-fact of the catastrophic earth movement. (Record, pp. 
1387-89.) Thereafter, on October 6, 1989, the trial court 
entered Judgment on Special Verdict in favor of the Railroad 
dismissing all claims with prejudice. (Record, pp. 1492-96.) 
The plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial, heard on January 3, 1990, 
was denied. (Record, p. 1537.) 
This action was commenced on March 10, 1986 with the 
filing of a Complaint against the Railroad, the State of Utah, 
Department of Public Safety and Department of Transportation, 
and Utah County. (Record, pp. 1-33.) The essence of the 
Complaint was inverse condemnation. Subsequently, after 
numerous amendments (Record, pp. 130-46, 600-01, 702-03), the 
plaintiffs were left with but one defendant--the Railroad--and 
one theory of liability — negligence. (Record, pp. 729-31, 
734-35.) 
An initial trial date of August 10, 1987 was 
eventually continued to February 21, 1989. (Record, pp. 
150-52, 746.) The parties were directed in a Scheduling Order 
to exchange witness lists over ninety days before trial. 
(Record, pp. 747-48.) The plaintiffs then sought once more for 
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leave to file an amended complaint--their third. The trial 
court granted leave to amend, vacated the previous trial date, 
and set a new trial date for August 14, 1989. (Record pp. 
818-821, 870-71, 872-878. ) 
Following the continuance, the parties were unable to 
reach agreement on a form of pretrial order despite the urgings 
of the trial court. On August 1, 1989, thirteen days before 
trial, the plaintiffs notified the Railroad that they intended 
to call seven witnesses not previously identified by them and 
to read from the depositions of seventy-three individuals taken 
in separate litigation. Dr. Shroder was one of the seven new 
witnesses. On August 3, 1989, the Railroad brought a motion to 
exclude the new witnesses first proposed by the plaintiffs on 
August 1, 1989 and to seek disclosure of the specific 
deposition testimony to be read at trial. The trial court, 
after a lengthy hearing, ordered the exclusion of Dr. Shroder 
and other witnesses and required that the plaintiffs designate 
the portions of the depositions they would utilize at trial. 
(Hearing of August 3, 1989, Record p. 1551 [hereinafter "August 
3, 1989 hearing"], pp. 25-26.) As will be pointed out 
hereafter, the plaintiffs specifically refused to make an offer 
of proof of the anticipated testimony of Dr. Shroder at the 
August 3, 1989 hearing. (August 3, 1989 hearing, pp. 18-19.) 
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Trial commenced on August 14, 1989. After the 
Railroad rested, the plaintiffs offered no rebuttal evidence, 
did not attempt to call Dr. Shroder and did not offer any 
insurance evidence. (Record, pp. 1382-84.) Following twelve 
days of testimony, the eight person jury rendered a unanimous 
special verdict in favor of the Railroad. The jury 
specifically found that the Railroad's actions were not a cause 
-in-fact of the catastrophic Thistle slide. (Record, pp. 
1387-89.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The plaintiffs did not name Dr. John Shroder as a 
potential witness until thirteen days prior to trial. This 
occurred even though the plaintiffs were aware of Dr. Shroder 
and his relevant work and expertise for many months prior to 
the trial date of August 14, 1989. The trial court had 
previously informed counsel for the parties that known 
witnesses were to be named by July 14, 1989. 
At the August 3, 1989 hearing and thereafter at trial, 
the plaintiffs failed to make an offer of proof with respect to 
Dr. Shroder as is required under Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Further, after the defense had rested at 
trial, the plaintiffs did not then seek to call Dr. Shroder as 
a rebuttal witness. In short, the plaintiffs have waived their 
right to object to this claimed error. 
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Evidence of the Railroad's property insurance for 
damage to its line was properly excluded as being irrelevant. 
If such evidence were deemed relevant, the plaintiffs waived 
any error by failing, after the Railroad rested its case, to 
offer the evidence in its rebuttal. In fact, the plaintiffs 
offered no rebuttal evidence. 
The reading of Mr. Jackson's deposition testimony, 
which had a vague reference to insurance, was so innocuous in 
the overall scheme of the testimony as to be harmless. 
Further, the plaintiffs failed to object to the claimed error. 
With respect to Juror Keith Heber, the plaintiffs have 
made no showing at all that Mr. Heber1s presence on the jury 
was in any way prejudicial. Even if the plaintiffs could show 
that Mr. Heber should have been excused for cause, the error 
would be harmless because the verdict was unanimous for the 
Railroad. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION 
OF DR. SHRODER AS A WITNESS. 
A. By Failing to Make an Offer of Proof with Respect 
to the Anticipated Testimony of Dr. Shroder, the 
Plaintiffs Have No Basis for Challenging the 
Trial Court's Exclusion of Dr. Shroder. 
In order to perfect one's record of error with respect 
to the exclusion of evidence, the complaining party must comply 
with Rule 103 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. In pertinent 
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part, Rule 103(a)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states 
unequivocally: 
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits 
or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the 
party is affected, and . . ., [i]n case the ruling is 
one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer. . . . 
Although the plaintiffs assert that they complied with 
Rule 103(a)(2) (Appellants' Brief p. 9), examination of the 
Record makes it clear that no proffer was made. At the 
hearing on the Railroad's motion to exclude Dr. SLr^der as a 
witness, the plaintiffs1 counsel made the following statement 
(which apparently the plaintiffs now contend constituted the 
requisite proffer): 
MR. YOUNG: I finally was able to contact Mr. 
Shroder. I don't want to represent 
everything he might say, because at 
this point in time I've provided him a 
significant amount of material, and he 
made some preliminary conclusions to me 
over the phone, which I would deem to 
be work product, but which are very 
beneficial to my clients and very 
helpful to my case. And if his 
conclusions are reinforced by the, by 
the depositions and things I've now 
sent him, then I would definitely want 
to call him as a witness. He's an 
expert. He's the guy that wrote for 
the Utah Geological Survey the History 
of Utah Slides. He's located in Omaha, 
Nebraska. 
(August 3, 1989 Hearing, p. 19.) 
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Under no circumstance does this statement qualify as 
an offer of proof. Not only did the plaintiffs fail to make a 
proffer, they purposely refused to disclose even "the substance 
of the evidence" citing a "work-product" privilege. The bold 
and unsupported assertion that Dr. Shroderfs testimony would 
somehow be "beneficial" to the plaintiffs' case fails to 
fulfill any of the requirements of Rule 103(a)(2). 
Where no proffer is made, this Court has no record to 
evaluate any alleged error. In State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 
498-500 (Utah 1986), this Court stated: 
[W]e will not set aside a verdict because of the 
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless a proffer of 
evidence appears of record, and we believe that the 
excluded evidence would probably have had a 
substantial influence in bringing about a different 
verdict. Utah R. Evid. 5 (superseded Sept. 1, 1983). 
Where it is unlikely that the excluded testimony 
prejudiced the defendant's rights in a substantial 
manner, the error is harmless and the case is not 
subject to reversal. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
This Court cannot find that the excluded evidence "would 
probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a 
different verdict" when it does not have before it a record of 
the excluded testimony. The Record before this tribunal is 
devoid of any evidence sufficient to make this determination. 
Unlike Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), in 
which the trial court had excluded the defendant's only expert 
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on the issue of valuation, the Thistle plaintiffs were in a 
position to call and did call two other expert witnesses on the 
question of causation of the slide--Dr. Joseph M. Olsen, holder 
of a Doctorate Degree from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and Blaine D. Leonard, holder of a Masters Degree 
from the University of Utah. Both were soils engineers and 
each testified that the Railroad's cut was a cause of the 
failure. (Olsen, pp. 3, 53; Leonard, pp. 2, 44-46, 70.) With 
no record of proffered testimony, it may be assumed that, at 
best, Dr. Shroderfs testimony would have been cumulative, and 
that his ultimate opinion would be consistent with that of 
Leonard and Dr. Olsen. In Ramme1, supra, 721 P.2d at 500, 
this Court quoted State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utah 1977) 
as follows: 
"Courts have found no prejudice where information that 
may be brought out by further questioning was already 
before the jury either from the testimony of others 
or by implication from the witnesses' own testimony." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Since the jury had before it the testimony of Dr. 
Olsen and Mr. Leonard with respect to causation and chose not 
to accept their opinion, it would be purest speculation based 
upon the Record herein to conclude that the excluded testimony 
Mwould probably have had a substantial influence in bringing 
about a different verdict." State v. Rammel, supra, 721 P.2d 
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at 499-500. In Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 
P.2d 1286, 1288 (Utah 1978), this Court stated: 
A judgment will not be reversed for an alleged error 
in the exclusion of evidence unless it appears in the 
record that the error was prejudicial. [Appellant's] 
failure to make a proffer of proof as to what his 
evidence would show precludes him from asserting on 
appeal that the exclusion was error. 
(Footnote omitted.) 
The plaintiffs have further contended herein that they 
were denied the right to call Dr. Shroder as a rebuttal 
witness. (Appellants' Brief pp. 12-13.) The plaintiffs have 
failed to direct this Court to any place in the Record that 
documents an attempt to call Dr. Shroder as a rebuttal 
witness. The reason for this failure is simple: the Record 
contains no evidence of any such attempt. This Court's 
attention is invited to the Clerk's Minute Entry for August 24, 
1989 (Record, p. 1384) where at the conclusion of the 
Railroad's case it is recorded: "Defendant rests-- Plaintiff 
rests." There is no entry in the clerk's minutes that the 
plaintiffs attempted to call Dr. Shroder as a rebuttal witness. 
Further, it appears clear from the Record that 
plaintiffs were not foreclosed by the trial court from calling 
Dr. Shroder as a rebuttal witness. (August 3, 1989 Hearing, 
pp. 28-30.) The plaintiffs for whatever reason made the 
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purposeful choice of not calling Dr. Shroder in rebuttal. 
They should not be permitted to raise this issue for the first 
time on appeal in the absence of any objection in the record. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In 
Excluding Dr. Shroder As A Witness On Behalf Of 
Plaintiffs. 
Even if this Court were to determine that the 
plaintiffs have made a sufficient proffer of Dr. Shroderfs 
testimony in the trial court, that Court was still well within 
its inherent power to control the proceedings before it in 
excluding Dr. Shroder from testifying in the plaintiffs' case 
in chief. Unfortunately, in order to discuss this issue 
sufficiently, the long and twisted history of the plaintiffs' 
delay in pretrial proceedings must be recounted. 
Following at least two attempts to amend the original 
Complaint and following the granting of several defendants' 
motions for full and partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs 
were left two years after filing this action with a single 
claim of negligence against the Railroad. The trial court then 
set a new trial date of February 21, 1989. (Record, p. 746.) 
In consultation with counsel, the Court also entered a 
Scheduling Order requiring, among other things, that witness 
lists be exchanged by November 15, 1988, over ninety days 
before trial, and that discovery be completed no later than 
December 23, 1988. (Record, pp. 747-48.) 
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In January, 1989, as counsel sought to finalize a 
pretrial order and to prepare for trial, it came to the 
attention of the Railroad's counsel that the plaintiffs, in 
attempting to prove negligence, intended to avoid the limits of 
the allegations set forth in their Second Amended Complaint by 
seeking to prove that actions taken by the Railroad prior to 
the major earth movement of April 1983 constituted negligence. 
At a January 31, 1989 hearing on this issue, the trial court 
gave the plaintiffs1 counsel a choice of either proceeding to 
trial without asserting claims of negligence based on 
pre-April, 1983 acts or continuing the trial to August 14, 1989 
with leave to amend the pleadings to state expressly claims 
based on pre-April, 1983 conduct. (Record, pp. 818-21, 
870-71.) The plaintiffs chose the latter course and, on 
February 13, 1989, the plaintiffs filed their Third Amended 
Complaint. (Record, pp. 872-78.) 
Contemporaneous with the discussions before the trial 
court regarding the scope of the claims, several events 
occurred that bear on the identification of witnesses and the 
progress of discovery. On January 31, 1989, the plaintiffs 
filed with the Court the Affidavit of Blaine Leonard. (Record, 
pp. 839-68.) Attached thereto was a report by James E. Slosson 
upon which Mr. Leonard relied, and in that report, among 
fifteen items set forth in a bibliography, were citations to 
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the two articles on the Thistle slide by J. F. Shroder that are 
now attached to Appellants' Brief herein as Appendix "A." 
(Record, p. 859 at Items 12 and 13.) About the same time, in a 
January 9, 1989 draft of the pretrial order sent: to the 
appellants1 counsel, the Railroad disclosed that: it intended to 
call Bruce Kaliser, a well-known Utah geologist,, as a witness. 
(Record, p. 1049.) Later, a June 19, 1989 draft of the 
pretrial order disclosed that the Railroad would call James E. 
Slosson as a witness. (Record, p. 1063.) Despite this 
on-going disclosure of defendant's witnesses, the Railroad 
encountered considerable difficulty in ascertaining precisely 
who the plaintiffs proposed to call as witnesses at trial. 
(Record, pp. 948-50.) 
As a result of this difficulty, on June 27, 1989, the 
trial court held a hearing to consider the state of the 
parties' preparation for the August 14, 1989 trial date. 
(Record, p. 1543.) At that time, the Court denied the 
plaintiffs' oral request for a further continuance of the trial 
date. (Transcript of June 27, 1989 hearing [Record, p. 1543], 
p. 21.) The Court directed the parties to prepare a pretrial 
The Railroad objects to this Appendix A to the extent 
that the plaintiffs are seeking to indicate that it was 
admitted in evidence in the Court below. It was not an exhibit 
at trial. Parts of Appendix "A" were relied upon by expert 
witnesses in rendering their opinions. 
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order and to identify witnesses to be called at trial within 
the next ten days. (June 27, 1989 hearing, p. 28; see also 
Record, p. 1027.) Thereafter, on July 19-20, 1989, the 
Railroad completed the depositions of Messrs. Olsen and Leonard 
(which had been commenced several months earlier) while the 
plaintiffs deposed one of the Railroad's experts. (Record, pp. 
991-93, 1006.) 
On August 1, 1989, thirteen days prior to the 
scheduled trial, the plaintiffs provided the Railroad with 
their witness list. (August 3, 1989 hearing, p. 2.) That list 
contained the names of several persons, including Dr. Shroder, 
that had never appeared previously on any draft pretrial order 
or witness list. In addition, the plaintiffs listed 
seventy-three depositions that they proposed to read at trial. 
(Record, pp. 1010-21.) The Railroad moved to strike the names 
of the five persons from the witness list and to obtain an 
order forcing the plaintiffs to identify specifically those 
pages of the seventy-three depositions that they would read at 
trial. On August 3, 1989, eleven days before trial, an 
expedited hearing was held on the Railroad's motions. (Record, 
pp. 1026-1029.) The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs, in 
light of the Court's previous orders and deadlines, had so 
delayed the naming of these belated witnesses that certain of 
them could not be called at trial. The excluded witnesses 
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included Dr. Shroder. (August 3, 1987 hearing; Record, pp. 
1210-13. ) 
The plaintiffs' counsel conceded at the August 3, 1989 
hearing that he knew of Dr. Shroder for many months prior to 
naming him as a witness. The following exchange occurred 
between the Court and the plaintiffs' counsel: 
THE COURT: 
MR. YOUNG: 
THE COURT: 
MR. YOUNG: 
When did you find out about him, from 
whom? 
About Dr. Shroder? 
Yes. 
Dr. Olson [sic] and I were reading over 
Dr. Slosson's report, which is a report 
that I have had in my possession for 
many, many months, [it] lists about 
five people that have written about the 
Thistle slide, including Dr. Hinsie, 
Dr. Rigby, Mr. Olsen and Dr. Shroder. 
When I was with Mr. Olson [sic] on July 
the 19th or 20th, I agreed that Ifd 
attempt to locate all of those men and 
talk to all of those men about the 
Thistle slide, because they had written 
about the slide mass and diagrammed it 
and platted it prior to 1983, some of 
them as early as 1950. 
I finally was able to contact Mr. 
Shroder. I don't want to represent 
everything he might say, because at 
this point in time I've provided him a 
significant amount: of material, and he 
made some preliminary conclusions to me 
over the phone, which I would deem to 
be work product, but which are very 
beneficial to my clients and very 
helpful to my case. And if his 
conclusions are reinforced by the, by 
the depositions and things I've now 
sent him, then I would definitely want 
to call him as a witness. He's an 
expert. He's the guy that wrote for 
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the Utah Geological Survey and the 
History of Utah Slides. HeTs located 
in Omaha, Nebraska. 
(August 3, 1989 hearing, pp. 18-19.) 
Later, the Court responded to counsel's clear 
admission of delay: 
THE COURT: 
MR. YOUNG: 
THE COURT: 
MR. YOUNG: 
. . . But these other witnesses, Mr. 
Young, I can see no reason why you can 
come in at a late day and say "I 
decided to use them" because they have 
not been shown to you. Mr. Shroder, if 
he was writing papers and his name was 
referred to in other papers, that 
you've obviously had access to, --
I have. 
There's the time when you should have 
started digging. 
Your Honor, what you have indicated is 
true. His name has been available in 
other documents and reports and papers 
for a long time. There is no question 
about that. 
I need to make a record in the 
strongest way, particularly with Mr. 
Shroder. Dr. Shroder, that my not 
being able to use him and his expertise 
and his testimony about what the 
railroad knew or should have known and 
what they did or didn't do, is critical 
to my lawsuit. It's just as critical 
as Dr. Olsen's and Dr. Leonard's 
testimony. And I think I'm horribly 
prejudiced. These people have the 
opportunity to depose him. I'll make 
him available. I don't honestly know 
the bottom line of all of his 
testimony. Mr. Beckwith's been 
referring to his reports very favorably 
to their side all day long. 
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THE COURT: Well, you have your record, Mr. Young. 
I understand your position. And I'm 
telling you, in my view, it's too 
late. And that even though they give 
them an opportunity to depose next 
week, then they've got to get experts, 
they've got to get somebody, if they 
want to counter it, so that you don't 
have a reasonable opportunity to 
prepare your case, either side. It 
seems to me that this is something that 
ought to have been done a long time ago. 
(August 3, 1989 hearing, pp. 28-29.) 
On August 15, 1989, the District Court entered an 
order that "[t]he parties may not call at trial any witness not 
listed in the drafts of the proposed pretrial order on or 
before July 14, 1989." (Record, pp. 1210-12.) Thereafter, on 
August 28, 1989, the Court applied the standard set forth in 
its Order of August 15, 1989 to prohibit the Railroad from 
calling its appraisal witness, David Van Drimmelen. (Record, 
pp. 1217-19 at paragraph 5.) 
The trial court in excluding Dr. Shroder did not abuse 
its discretion. The trial of this matter had been continued on 
numerous occasions. Each continuance had been requested by the 
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs knew that the trial court's 
Scheduling Order for the previous trial date had required the 
exchange of witness lists over ninety days before trial. The 
final date for the trial was set for August 14, 1989. After 
over three years of pretrial proceedings and preparation and 
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with expert's depositions completed, it would have been 
patently unfair to permit the naming of a purportedly crucial 
expert less than two weeks before trial. To take the 
deposition of Dr. Shroder (as the plaintiffs suggested) on such 
short notice only to learn that new geotechnical theories were 
being advanced or that facts previously unknown were being 
disclosed would necessarily have required further extensive 
investigation and additional study and preparation by the 
RailroadTs experts. To undertake this intense discovery and 
corresponding preparation at the same time that counsel was 
seeking to complete the numerous tasks essential for adequate 
preparation for trial would have caused extreme inconvenience 
and corresponding prejudice to the Railroad. 
The trial court was mindful of this prejudice when it 
stated at the August 3, 1989 hearing: 
THE COURT: Well, you have your record, Mr. Young. 
I understand your position. And I'm 
telling you, in my view, itTs too 
late. And that even though they give 
them an opportunity to depose next 
week, then they've got to get experts, 
they've got to get somebody, if they 
want to counter it, so that you don't 
have a reasonable opportunity to 
prepare your case, either side. It 
seems to me that this is something that 
ought to have been done a long time ago, 
(August 3, 1989 Hearing, p. 29.) 
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In Bertrom v. Harris, 423 P.2d 909 (Alaska 1967) the 
Supreme Court of Alaska held that the trial court: had not 
abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of a Mr. 
Jones. The court found that the proponent of Mr. Jones' 
testimony had been aware of the witness for over a year 
stated: "In light of this record, we see no reason which could 
justify appellant for the delay in designating Jones as a 
witness he intended to call at trial." 423 P.2d at 918. The 
Bertram court further stated: "We find no abuse of 
discretion. The judge had a basis for finding it inexcusable 
that Jones' name was not furnished as a witness by appellant." 
423 P.2d at 917. 
On June 27, 1989, over a month before the Court's 
August 3, 1989 ruling, the plaintiffs' counsel in this action 
told the trial court and opposing counsel the following: 
MR. YOUNG Your Honor, we have delineated the 
experts and people and individuals that 
we do intend to call, in terms of Dr. 
Olsen and Dr. Leonard and others . . . 
(June 27, 1989 hearing, p. 28.) 
Troubled by the seemingly endless delay caused by the 
plaintiffs, the trial court then stated: 
THE COURT: The trouble is for reasons that may be 
important, [you] put off doing what 
ought to have been done a long time 
ago. And that in my judgment [that] 
isn't any reason to continue this 
lawsuit, if you haven't done the 
legwork that you ought to have done. 
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And you each are entitled to know who 
it is you are legitimately going to 
call. Do that you don't end up in 
surprises. And if you don't disclose 
who they are, I suppose the Court, the 
only thing it can do is to make an 
order they cannot be permitted to 
testify. And that's unfortunate. 
(Transcript, pp. 28 and 29.) 
It can thus be seen that the plaintiffs on June 27, 1989 
informed the Court and counsel that they had named their 
witnesses. Further, the trial court informed the plaintiffs 
that if they did not expeditiously list their witnesses they 
were subject to exclusion. 
The reason for this inexcusable delay in naming 
witnesses by the plaintiffs became clear at the hearing on the 
plaintiffs' Motion for New Trial wherein counsel for the 
plaintiffs candidly admitted: 
MR. YOUNG: The Court is aware, and I readily 
admit, that my preparation for this 
trial was bunched in great extent in 
the last six weeks to two months after 
the hearing before your Honor in May or 
June with regard to the amended 
complaint and setting this thing for 
trial. Although it is not an excuse, 
your Honor, I think that it is a fact 
of life that the Thistle people don't 
have a lot of money, and to take on a 
company like the railroad is darn 
expensive. 
(Transcript of Hearing on Motion for New Trial, 
Record, p. 1563 [hereinafter "New Trial"], p. 5.) 
Despite the fact that (a) this case had been pending 
for over three years, (b) the Court had entered and continued 
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numerous trial dates, (c) various scheduling orders had been 
ignored, and (d) the Court had warned of the exclusion of 
witnesses if they were not named promptly, the plaintiffs 
failed to disclose its witnesses in a timely fashion because 
counsel made the purposeful choice of not preparing until the 
eve of trial. If rial courts are to have any control over 
their calendars, the convenience of jurors and the orderly 
presentation of evidence, then it cannot be found that the 
Court herein abused its discretion. 
II. EVIDENCE OF THE RAILROAD'S PROPERTY INSURANCE WAS 
PROPERLY EXCLUDED AS IRRELEVANT TO ANY ISSUE 
CONSIDERED BY THE JURY. 
This Court will reverse the trial court's evidentiary 
rulings only if "it clearly appears that [the trial court] so 
abused [its] discretion that there is likelihood that an 
injustice resulted." State v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 
1979). Such "injustice" is found and reversal is appropriate 
"only if the error is such that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that, in its absence, there would have been a result 
more favorable to the complaining party." Cerritos Trucking 
Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608, 613 (Utah 1982). 
At trial, the plaintiffs contended that evidence of 
the Railroad's property insurance was relevant to the issues of 
knowledge of the landslide and control of the property involved 
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in the landslide. However, the trial court observed that 
the Railroad had never denied knowledge of the slide. As a 
consequence, the Court concluded: "I can't see any relevance 
as to [insurance evidence], unless . . . the testimony is: 
well, we didn't know anything about this, we had no knowledge 
concerning it." (Motion Hearing, p. 13.) Thereafter, at 
trial, the plaintiffs failed to assert at any time that the 
Railroad had opened the door to insurance evidence by denying 
knowledge. Thus, the Record shows that the plaintiffs rested 
at the end of the Railroad's evidence rather than offering 
rebuttal testimony, including any evidence of insurance. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling 
that evidence of property insurance was not relevant to the 
The plaintiffs fail to cite any record support for the 
assertion that "over a period of years, [the Railroad] 
increased its insurance significantly on that particular 
section of the track on its railway." Appellants' Brief, p. 
15. The plaintiffs are well aware that the Railroad's 
insurance policies covered the entirety of its 690 miles of 
track. There was no single policy or group of policies 
covering any specific geographical area such as Thistle. 
Further, the occasional increases in casualty coverage over a 
period of better than ten years are more accurately a prudent 
response to the inflation of the late 1970's and early 1980fs 
and to an improved perception of the potential risks to its 
overall operation rather than evidence of a specific perceived 
risk at Thistle. (Hearing on Motions in Limine, Record, p. 
1552 ["Motion Hearing"], pp. 6-7.) 
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issues to be decided by the jury at trial. In reviewing that 
ruling, this Court: is hampered in the first instance by the 
failure of the plaintiffs to make a proffer of the insurance 
evidence. Nowhere in the Record before this Court is there any 
representation as to (a) what otherwise admissible evidence the 
plaintiffs proposed to put before the jury to show the scope of 
the Railroad's property insurance coverage or (b) what facts 
that evidence would establish. Absent such a proffer, this 
Court has no basis to evaluate the plaintiffs1 contention that 
the District Court: abused its discretion. See, e.g. , Ashton 
v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987). 
To be relevant, evidence must tend to prove a fact 
that is actually at issue in the action. See Rule 401, Utah 
Rules of Evidence. Applying this standard, the District Court 
correctly concluded that evidence of the Railroad's property 
insurance was irrelevant and inadmissible. The Court expressed 
its readiness to allow such evidence if the Railroad disputed 
its knowledge of the upthrust historically caused by the 
ancient landslide. At trial, the plaintiffs never contended 
that the Railroad had denied knowledge of the movement caused 
by the ancient landslide at Thistle before the catastrophic 
movement in 1983. Thus, the fact identified by the Court that 
might have made evidence of property insurance relevant was 
never in dispute. 
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The plaintiffs failed to advance any other legitimate 
basis for admission of the insurance evidence. Their brief 
herein assumes without explanation that the property insurance 
is relevant. However, the authorities cited fail to support 
that position. In Reid v. Owens, 93 P.2d 680 (Utah 1939), the 
defendant frankly admitted that he had purchased liability 
insurance as the result of his son's reckless propensities. In 
attempting to hold the parent directly responsible for the 
child's wrongful acts, such proof of knowledge was essential, 
relevant and not tainted with potential for prejudice. 
The plaintiffs cite both Wigmore and McCormick for the 
proposition that the policies behind Rule 411 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence should not apply by analogy to the use of property 
insurance evidence proposed by the plaintiffs at trial. At the 
Motion Hearing, the plaintiffs' counsel disclosed with clarity 
the manner in which he intended to use the property insurance 
evidence: 
MR. YOUNG: I believe that the sequence of events, 
the railroad continuing to increase its 
insurance coverage, the railroad doing 
nothing at the toe of the Thistle 
slide, knowing that it was a problem; 
the evidence, your Honor, is going to 
be, and the defendants don't dispute 
this, that over the years mother nature 
pushed Thistle up over five feet, 
pushed it east two to three feet. The 
railroad knew about it. They stood 
there hanging by their thumbs with 
their fingers crossed and increasing 
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their insurance on that trackage at all 
times. 
Because that is a slide that's known, 
itfs been documented since the 50's, 
itfs documented in the 60's, it's been 
on a geologic map. You've got to do 
something when mother nature keeps 
telling you its coming up. What do 
they do? Buy insurance. They 
collected 29.5 million dollars. 
And I think that [insurance evidence 
is] relevant to show that they were 
negligent. In other words, that rather 
than do anything, knowing they had a 
problem, they continued to increase 
their insurance, which paid them for 
their loss. 
(Motion Hearing, pp. 11-12 [emphasis added].) 
Simply put, the plaintiffs wished to argue that the Railroad 
intentionally bought insurance in lieu of taking steps to 
prevent the catastrophic landslide and that evidence of such 
insurance is evidence of negligence. 
Rule 411 states a policy that one's prudence in 
insuring against a potential liability or loss should not 
constitute proof of negligence or wrongful conduct. The 
failure to take precautions must be measured against whatever 
duty the law imposes, not against a party's efforts to shift 
potential risk. Wigmore notes that "the fact of insurance 
covering liability might tend to make the insured less careful" 
is an "inference . . . too elusive to be serviceable as 
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evidence. . . ." 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 283 at p. 174 
(Chadbourne ed. 1979). McCormick concurs: "Hardly anyone 
questions the premise that [insurance] evidence is irrelevant 
to the exercise of reasonable care." E. Cleary, McCormick on 
Evidence § 201 at p. 597 (3d Ed. 1984). Wright and Graham 
characterize the notion that "the existence of insurance 
motivated [a] person to behave carelessly . . ." as an "absurd 
hypothesis." 23 C. Wright and K. Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 5364 (1980). This is the very "hypothesis" 
advanced by the plaintiffs. 
The fact that Rule 411 applies by its terms only to 
liability insurance affords the plaintiffs little comfort. 
Rule 411 falls under Article IV of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
headed "Relevancy and Its Limits." Article IV does not purport 
to resolve all relevancy issues but only certain "close calls" 
such as habit and routine, settlement offers and liability 
insurance. If insurance purchased specifically to cover 
liability to third parties is not deemed to be relevant to the 
issue of negligence, evidence of insurance for a direct loss to 
the insured without reference to third parties can hardly be 
viewed as more relevant to the issue of negligence. Such a 
connection is attenuated in the extreme and discredited by the 
most respected commentators. 
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Finally, Utah law requires that a party appealing an 
evidentiary ruling establish the reasonable likelihood that the 
ruling affected the result at trial. See Slusher v. Ospital, 
777 P.2d 437, 444 (Utah 1989); Cerritos Trucking, supra, 645 
P.2d at 613. The jury's Special Verdict eliminates any 
argument that the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine 
as to property insurance was material to the result at trial. 
The jury's sole determinative finding was that the activities 
on the Railroad's property at the base of the slide were not a 
cause-in-fact of the catastrophic earth movement: in April and 
May of 1983. The jury never reached the issues of knowledge, 
control or negligence. The plaintiffs cannot show that any 
permissible use of insurance evidence would have affected the 
jury's verdict. 
III. THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO OBJECT TO AND SUFFERED NO 
PREJUDICE FROM ANY ALLUSION TO INSURANCE PAYMENTS 
DURING TRIAL. 
The plaintiffs failed to raise a timely objection to 
the Railroad's reading of the deposition testimony of the 
plaintiff Maurice W. Jackson ("Jackson") at the time of trial. 
One searches the record in vain for a timely objection to the 
manner in which Jackson's deposition was used. "This Court 
will not review alleged error when no objection at all is made 
at the trial level." Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 781 
(Utah 1986). See also Rule 103(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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The plaintiffs complain specifically of a single 
allusion to insurance payments made in cross-examination of 
Jackson. Testifying about the extent of his losses, Jackson 
denied that his property was independently appraised after the 
slide occurred. (Abstract from Transcript of Trial, Maurice W. 
Jackson, Record, p. 1555, [hereinafter "Jackson"], p. 23.) In 
the face of that denial, counsel confronted Jackson with his 
contrary deposition testimony. Therein Jackson acknowledged 
that, after the flood, someone had "listed the replacement 
values of the home, I think, as $95,000, and they depreciated 
us $19,000, and then they paid us along about $75,000 for 
that." (Jackson, p. 31.) The plaintiffs contend that this 
single exchange, precipitated by and based on Jackson's own 
testimony, requires reversal and retrial. 
The brief exchange was not what the plaintiffs 
represent it to be. Nowhere in the record is there any mention 
of insurance. All that Jackson stated was "they paid us. . . 
." This does not begin to approach the level of prejudicial 
disclosure necessary to make this testimony a basis for 
reversal. 
Even if the allusion to insurance payments were 
significant and even if the plaintiffs had made timely 
objection thereto, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate 
that "[t]he exclusion of this evidence would . . . present the 
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likelihood of a different result/1 In re Estate of Hock, 655 
P.2d 1111, 1117 (Utah 1982).3 The majority of Jacksonfs 
testimony and the cross-examination at issue were directed 
exclusively at the issue of damages. The jury, in resolving 
the case on the issue of cause-in-fact, never addressed the 
issue of damages. Thus, as in Hock, supra, exclusion of the 
brief mention could not have impacted the juryfs verdict. 
IV. PLAINTIFFS HAVE MADE NO SHOWING WHATSOEVER OF JUROR 
BIAS WITH RESPECT TO JUROR KEITH HEBER. 
The plaintiffs' concerns regarding Mr. Heber, the jury 
foreman, rest on the unsubstantiated threshold assumption that 
Mr. Heber had the slightest idea (a) that Mr. Baxter was 
involved in the Boyd appeal and (b) that Mr. Baxter was 
affiliated with the appellants1 counsel. All facts in the 
Record now before this Court are to the contrary. Mr. Heber 
gave no indication on voir dire that he was acquainted with 
anyone from Young & Kester. In conversation with the Court and 
counsel, Mr. Heber was admirably forthright about his personal 
knowledge of the Thistle disaster, his scheduling problems and 
his general disillusionment with the judicial process. 
At most, the reference in Jackson cross examination 
would impact only him and not any of his co-plaintiffs. 
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First, in response to the Court's questioning, Mr. 
Heber disclosed a prior relationship with an expert witness 
employed by the plaintiffs: 
MR. HEBER: . . . I know Reed Snarr. He installed 
the vacuum system in my house. 
THE COURT: Anything about that relationship which 
would prevent you in your mind from 
fairly judging this case, if you were 
chosen to serve? 
MR. HEBER: No. 
THE COURT: Would you feel comfortable having a 
juror such as you, if you were the 
position of either of the parties? 
MR. HEBER: Yes. 
(Abstract from Transcript of Trial, Voir Dire, 
Record p. 1557 [hereinafter "Voir Dire"], p. 17.) 
Next, in response to the Court's inquiry whether any 
potential jurors had independent knowledge of the Thistle 
disaster, Mr. Heber volunteered: 
MR. HEBER: . . . I was returning from Richfield on 
that fateful Saturday evening, and via 
the Spanish Fork Canyon, and as I came 
through there I stopped and got out of 
my vehicle and walked down. And that 
was right at the time that they had 
heavy equipment there at the site 
trying to remove the dirt, to keep the 
water flowing through that canyon. And 
while I was there, they had given 
orders to pull that heavy equipment off 
of the mountain because the slide was 
moving faster than they could remove 
the soil. So I watched them pull that 
equipment back off, as the water 
started filling up into Thistle. 
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THE COURT: Considering that to be so, do you feel 
that you still could listen to all of 
the evidence that will come before you 
as a juror in this courtroom and make 
your decision based upon that? 
MR. HEBER: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: Would you feel comfortable having a 
juror such as you, if you were in a 
position of either of these parties? 
MR. HEBER. Yes. 
(Voir Dire, p. 30.) 
Later, Mr. Heber requested the opportunity to discuss 
impediments to his service on the jury with the Court and 
counsel in chambers. In that discussion, Mr. Heber disclosed 
that he was acting as his own attorney in a domestic matter. 
He further acknowledged some difficulty with the judicial 
system in that regard. (Voir Dire, pp. 80-83.) 
Finally, in open court, Mr. Heber disclosed the 
following about his background: 
MR. HEBER: Keith Heber. I was born and raised in 
Utah. I grew up in Magna, until I came 
to Brigham Young University. I've 
graduated from Brigham Young University 
with a bachelors degree and associate 
in economics. I'm single. And I have 
no children. I work for the Department 
of Employment Security as an 
aggrievance --
(Voir Dire, p. 98.) 
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Given this range of candid disclosure and Mr. Heber1s 
undisguised desire to be relieved from jury service, there is 
no basis to assume that he knowingly failed to disclose any 
previous awareness of the plaintiffs' counsel. Rather, the 
inferences to be fairly drawn from the Record establish that 
Mr. Heber had no previous knowledge of Young & Kester or Mr. 
Baxter. 
Nothing that the plaintiffs have placed before this 
Court requires a contrary conclusion. The Reporter's 
Transcript cover sheets from the Industrial Commission hearings 
filed in connection with the Motion for New Trial do not 
reflect Mr. Baxter's name or the name of Young & Kester. 
(Record, pp. 1480-84.) Similarly, the reported decision, Boyd 
v. Department of Employment Security, 773 P.2d 398 (Utah App. 
1989), makes no mention of Young & Kester or of Mr. Heber. The 
plaintiffs have not demonstrated (a) that Mr. Heber even knew 
of Mr. Baxter or (b) if he did know of Mr. Baxter, that Mr. 
Heber also knew that Mr. Baxter was associated with Young & 
Kester or (c) if he knew of these facts, that Mr. Heber was 
thereby materially influenced in his consideration of this 
case. See Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828, 835 (Utah 
1980). Absent such a showing, the plaintiffs lack the factual 
predicate upon which to base a claim of juror misconduct. 
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The plaintiffs' counsel frankly acknowledged this in 
his argument to the trial court on the plaintiffs' motion for 
new trial. At that time, counsel conceded: 
MR. YOUNG: Item number 2, your Honor, with regard 
to the jury foreman. In their response 
the defendants say Young doesn't know 
what was in Heber's mind, and Young 
doesn't know that Heber was prejudiced 
against him. My statement to you, 
sir, is I do not know that. I have 
not talked to Mr. Heber. I suspect 
that if I did he would not have 
anything bad to say about me or our 
case. 
(New Trial Hearing, p. 11.) (Emphasis added.) 
In light of this concession, the Railroad respectfully suggests 
that this argument advanced by the plaintiffs is totally devoid 
of merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs have failed to advance any grounds for 
reversal of the trial court's Judgment. This Court should 
affirm the trial court's Judgment and award the Railroad its 
costs on appeal.
 yy 
±s/jL DATED thi  (JL day of August, 1990, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Michael F. Richman 
Eric 
Attorneys for Appellee 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
-36-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing ARGUMENT PRIORITY NO. 16 to be 
is ff^Az mailed, postage prepaid, th 
following: 
lay of August, 1990, to the 
Allen K. Young, Esq. 
Randy S. Kester, Esq. 
YOUNG & KESTER 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
3876R 
-37-
